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U.S. patent law protects only inventions that are nontrivial advances of the prior art.  The legal
requirement is called nonobviousness.  During the 1980s, the courts relaxed the nonobviousness
requirement for all inventions, and a new form of intellectual property, with a weaker
nonobviousness requirement, was created for semiconductor designs.  Supporters of these changes
argue that a less stringent nonobviousness requirement encourages private research and development
(R&D) by increasing the probability that the resulting discoveries will be protected from imitation.
This paper demonstrates that relaxing the standard of nonobviousness creates a tradeoff -- raising
the probability of obtaining a patent, but decreasing its value.  We show that weaker nonobviousness
requirements can lead to less R&D activity, and this is more likely to occur in industries that rapidly
innovate.  1  5 U.S.C. (1988), sections 101-3.  Novelty under the patent law stipulates that the person filing the patent is
the first person to have made the invention.  Nonobviousness is the requirement that the invention be a nontrivial
extension of what is already known.
2  Hence the title of J. Witherspoon’s Nonobviousness-The Ultimate Standard of Patentability, 1980.  See also
Merges (92).
3  Risberg (90), p. 251-2.
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1.  Introduction
American patent law stipulates that patents may be granted only to inventions that are useful,
novel, and nonobvious.
1  Taken together, these requirements define a standard of patentability that
separates discoveries into those eligible for patent protection and those that are not.  The most
important requirement is nonobviousness, which one author calls "the ultimate condition of
patentability."
2
A major concern during the 1980s was that discoveries in many high technology industries
were often ineligible for patent protection.  For example, during hearings on the semiconductor chip
industry, one expert testified:
"...patents generally do not protect the particular topographical layouts created by
chip designers.  The level of creativity involved in such layout designs does not
usually rise to the level required by the patent laws.  Most chip layouts fall into the
same unpatentable categories as dress designs -- variations on a single idea.  Thus the
design that makes one’s chip layout better than another is generally not patentable."
3
Congress responded to this problem by creating a new form of intellectual property, called
"mask rights," with a weak nonobviousness requirement, to protect chip designs.  But other changes
in American intellectual property law affected inventors in all industries.  For example, a4  See, for example, Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (81).
5  Of course, a change in the value of patents will alter R&D activity, and the actual computation of the
economic life of patents must take this into account.
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reorganization of the federal courts and a series of judicial decisions significantly relaxed the test of
nonobviousness used in patent litigation.  This paper examines how those changes affect the
incentive of firms to engage in R&D.
The value of a patent is affected by its length.  While the statutory life of a patent is 20 years,
we know from empirical research that the economic benefit of a patent is often exhausted before it
expires.
4  We call the economic life of a patent the amount of time the patented invention generates
positive profits.  In an environment where unprotected inventions are easily duplicated, the economic
life of a patent depends on (1) the rate of innovation, which determines how rapidly potentially
competing technologies develop; and (2) the nonobviousness requirement, which determines what
proportion of future discoveries will be protected by patents. 
A weak nonobviousness requirement implies that most future discoveries will be protected.
Today’s patent holder will be able to copy the few technologies not protected, but must compete
against the rest.  Such competition reduces, and eventually eliminates, her profits.  Under a strong
nonobviousness requirement, only a small proportion of future discoveries is protected.  Today’s
patent holder can copy most of the emerging discoveries.  Competing proprietary technologies take
longer to accumulate so the patent holder’s profits are larger and last longer.  Thus, holding the rate
of innovation constant, the economic life of patents is increasing in the standard of nonobviousness.
5
This suggests that the value of patents is increasing in the strictness of the nonobviousness
requirement.6  In fact, there appeared to be little recognition of any effect on the value of patents.  An exception is found
in the hearings on the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act.  See Section 2.
3
The incentive theory of patents argues that R&D activity is positively related to the expected
return to R&D.  The return to R&D is increasing in the value of patents but decreasing in the
probability that discoveries will not qualify for patent protection.  Increasing the standard of
nonobviousness increases the expected value of patents, but it decreases the probability that a given
invention will be protected.  We call the increase in the value of patents the dynamic effect, and the
reduction in the probability of obtaining protection the static effect, of raising the standard of
nonobviousness.  R&D activity increases or decreases, depending on which of these competing
effects is stronger.  The conventional wisdom during the 1980s was that the static effect would
dominate any dynamic effects.
6  Under this assumption, relaxing nonobviousness requirements
would indeed encourage R&D activity.
We evaluate this assumption using a model of sequential innovation where property rights
closely follow the "mask rights" created for the semiconductor manufacturing industry.  We
demonstrate the existence of a unique standard of nonobviousness that maximizes R&D activity in
an industry.  Using this critical standard, we can divide the range of possible requirements into
regions where either the static or dynamic effect dominates.  The share of all possible
nonobviousness requirements contained in the static region is a measure of the reliability of the
conventional wisdom.
Analysis of the model shows that the static region is smaller in industries that innovate
rapidly.  In fact, we show that the share of possible standards accounted for by the dynamic region
rises when we vary any of a number of parameters that increase the equilibrium rate of innovation7  In 1976 Intel attempted to copyright a number of semiconductor chip "masks."  These masks are stencils used
to produce the various layers of a semiconductor chip via the process of photolithography.  The Copyright Office refused
to accept the masks.  See Raskind (85), pp. 392-3.
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in an industry.  These results suggest that the conventional wisdom is least appropriate when applied
to rapidly innovating industries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act and the Federal Courts Improvement Act.  Section 3 reviews the literature on
patent attributes and the determination of firms’ R&D spending.  Section 4 introduces the model.
Section 5 constructs the symmetric, stationary equilibrium and describes its properties.  Section 6
shows how a change in the nonobviousness requirement affects R&D activity.  Section 7 concludes.
2.  Examples of Intellectual Property Reform
A.  The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984
The semiconductor manufacturing industry is one of the most innovative and research-
intensive sectors of the American economy.  Innovation occurs so rapidly that state-of-the-art
equipment and designs are obsolete in less than five years.  Given that the incentive to conduct R&D
is obviously high, one would expect the resulting inventions to be well protected by patents.  But
until recently, most semiconductor designs could not be patented because they did not satisfy the test
of nonobviousness applied by the courts.  Other forms of intellectual property protection were even
less effective.  Trade secret protection is of limited use because much of the knowledge acquired in
the development of a chip is evident in its layout.  Employee turnover in the industry also contributes
to the rapid diffusion of new techniques.  And firms cannot invoke copyright protection because
semiconductor designs are utilitarian in nature.
78  Indeed some observers believe that the American manufacturers moved to consolidate their comparative
advantage, which was in R&D, when it became clear that they could no longer dominate Japanese firms on the basis of
production technology alone. See Raskind and Stern (85), p. 263
9  Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III,  17 U.S.C. 901-914 (Supp. II 1984).
10  Raskind (85), p. 399.
11  Stern (85), p. 318.
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Weak patent protection contributed to an industrywide tradition of "reverse engineering"
competitors’ products.  Firms incorporate what they learn from their competitors’ designs into new
generations of their own.  While the industry has long tolerated reverse engineering, concern over
the protection of semiconductor designs increased as Japanese firms gained parity in manufacturing
technology during the 1970s.
8  In 1979, and again in 1983, a number of semiconductor manufacturers
lobbied Congress to extend copyright protection to semiconductor chip designs.  These proposals
failed because other firms objected to the complete elimination of reverse engineering implied by
copyright protection.  A compromise was achieved in the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984 (hereafter SCPA).
9
The SCPA created a new form of intellectual property, called  mask works.  Owners of mask
works are granted exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, and import products embodying the mask
work for a period of 10 years.  Remedies for infringement include injunctions, lost profits, and
sanctions up to $250,000.  Protection does not extend to masks that are not original or that consist
of commonplace, staple designs, or some combination of such designs that is not original.
10  This
nonobviousness standard is much less stringent than what is required by patent law and somewhat
more stringent than what is required for copyrights.
1112  The SCPA and its legislative histories do not provide a precise interpretation of the terms "substantially
identical" and "substantially similar."  Congress left these issues to be decided by the courts.  To date there has been only
one case, and the plaintiff prevailed.  This ruling established that copying only part of a chip design could infringe a mask
right, even where the defendant establishes extensive toil and effort.  See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 705 F. Supp. 491.
13  Raskind (85), p. 402.
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The primary limitation to the mask owner’s exclusive rights is the defense of reverse
engineering.  The SCPA specifies a two-pronged test for the determination of infringement.  The
original and the allegedly infringing chip are compared.  If they are "substantially identical," the
court will find infringement.  However, if the designs are only "substantially similar," the defendant
is immune from liability if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the defendant must demonstrate
substantial toil and investment in the development of its chip; (2) the resulting design must satisfy
the standard of originality specified by the SCPA.
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A successful defense of reverse engineering appears to require that the defendant’s design be
better than the plaintiff’s.  One author argues, "More likely, than not, for a defendant to prevail ... its
resultant ‘original mask work’ must be one that is functionally superior to the protected work, as
measured by the relevant technological criteria."  He continues, "The proof of improvement,
therefore, becomes the ultimate issue in establishing the defense of reverse engineering."
13 
Under certain, fairly weak conditions, the act allows a firm to appropriate another firm's
technology without prior permission and without paying any royalty.  This exception is unique to the
SCPA.  No other form of intellectual property protection links the questions of infringement to the
obviousness/nonobviousness of a potentially infringing design.  One expert, and a participant in the
legislative process that produced the SCPA, states:14  Stern (85), p. 336.
15  Pub. L. No 97-164.
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"Having any merit or qualifying for any kind of intellectual property protection is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to avoid infringement liability in patent
or copyright law.  An improvement patent is likely to infringe any ‘dominant’ patent
to which it is ‘subservient,’ and a derivative work copyright often cannot be exploited
without infringing the work from which it is derived.  Section 906(a)(2) takes the
unusual step of making this particular kind of derivative work, a reverse engineered
mask work, free of subservience to the earlier work."
14
While the SCPA increases the probability that semiconductor designs will be protected, the
implied protection is of short duration.  SCPA strikes a bargain between protecting the economic
rents of existing inventions and encouraging firms to build on those discoveries as freely as possible.
To do so, Congress specified a nonobviousness requirement considerably weaker than the one for
patents.
B.  The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
The Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA)  created a single venue for appeals of cases
involving patents, trademarks, government contracts, tax, and international trade.
15  The new court,
called the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), has been credited with increasing the16  See Sobel (88), p. 1090.
17  Sobel (88) states, "The aggregate of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the obviousness issue of section 103
is probably the most important change it has made," p. 1091.
18  One author finds that in the period 1953-77, 60% of patents adjudicated by the federal courts of appeals were
invalidated. While these cases represent only a tiny proportion of all patent litigation in the period, the statistic is
suggestive of the willingness of the courts to second guess the determinations of the Patent and Trademarks Office. See
Szczepanski (87), p. 301, citing G. Koenig, Patent Invalidity - A Statistical and Substantive Analysis, 1980.
19  Sobel (88), 1092-3. Prior to the FCIA, in some circumstances a party could prove an invention was obvious
with merely "a preponderance of the evidence." The CAFC requires that an alleged defendant show "clear and
convincing evidence" of patent invalidity.
20  This test was developed in Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
21  Sobel (88), p. 1095.
22  Ibid., p. 1095-6. In Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court stated:
"Indeed, evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record.  It
may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not."
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uniformity of patent decisions.
16  We focus here on CAFC decisions that relaxed the effective
standard of nonobviousness employed by the courts.
17
Prior to passage of the FCIA, patents were regularly invalidated at trial, even though they had
passed an investigation by the U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office.
18  CAFC decisions raised the
presumption of patent validity and altered the test of nonobviousness.
19  Before the FCIA, the
prevailing test of nonobviousness considered three factors: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
(2) the differences between the prior art and the patent claims; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in
the relevant art.
20  Secondary factors, such as commercial success, failure of others, and long felt
need, might also be relevant, but they could not override the three factors.
21  CAFC decisions
elevated the secondary factors -- in particular, commercial success -- to a fourth and sometimes
overriding factor.
2223  Coolley (94), p. 625. The title of another paper is also suggestive: see Robert Desmond (93), "Nothing
Seems Obvious to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit..."
24  Kastriner (91), p.23.
25  Dunner (85) reports that the CAFC found 54% of the patents it reviewed to be nonobvious, as compared to
a 30%  rate in the  initial trials.  This compares favorably to the rates reported by Szczepanski (87) for previous years.
The CAFC reversed 14% of lower court decisions that found an invention to be nonobvious.  In contrast, it reversed 31%
of lower court decisions that found an invention to be obvious.  Coolley (89) reports that the CAFC reversed only 10%
of cases that initially found the patent to be valid and 51% of cases where the patent was initially found to be invalid.
9
What is the significance of these decisions? One author states, "Many patent attorneys believe
that the obviousness defense is dead and that the cause of death lies in the decisions of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit."
23  Another writes that "as a result of these changes, patents today
are more likely to be held valid than, perhaps, at any time in our history."
24  An examination of the
outcomes of subsequent appeals supports this claim.
25
3.  The Literature on Patent Attributes and Innovation
Research and development and intellectual property are subjects of considerable academic
interest.  This section reviews only work that is most closely related to this paper.  The theory of
optimal patents began with Nordhaus (69, 72) and Scherer (72), who examine how the competing
objectives of providing an adequate incentive for R&D and minimizing monopoly distortions
determines an optimal patent length.  More recently, the work of Gilbert and Shapiro (90) and
Klemperer (90) extend the analysis by allowing a social planner to vary patent breadth as well as
length.  Patent breadth represents the degree to which a product or process must differ from a
patented one to avoid infringement of the patent.  These models consider a single innovation and
assume that the economic life of a patent is equivalent to the statutory length.
Patent breadth and nonobviousness are distinct characteristics.  Patent breadth determines
when the developer of a new invention must compensate the developer of a prior one.  The26  In filing for a patent, an inventor lists one or more "claims" that represent the contribution of the invention
over and above the prior art. The Patent and Trademarks Office examines, and possibly modifies, these claims before
awarding the patent. Infringement is determined at trial by comparing the allegedly infringing product or process to the
claims of the patent.
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nonobviousness requirement distinguishes between proprietary and non-proprietary discoveries.  An
invention may be obvious and yet may not infringe an existing patent.  Conversely, an invention may
satisfy the standard of nonobviousness and yet still infringe the claims of a prior patent.  The breadth
of a patent depends on the nature of the invention and tends to be idiosyncratic.
26  In this paper, we
focus exclusively on the standard of nonobviousness.  To do so, we assume a system of patent rights,
similar to the specifications of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, that eliminates the issue of
infringement altogether.
A number of papers evaluate the role of patents in the context of cumulative discoveries, i.e.,
where inventions build on each other.  Green and Scotchmer (92, 95) examine how patent breadth
and length, licensing, and cooperative agreements determine the division of profits between two
sequential innovators.  Their definition of patent breadth is comparable to the test of nonobviousness
employed in this paper.  The interpretation, however, is quite different.  They assume that both
inventions are patentable and examine how patent breadth determines the division of proprietary
rents between the initial and subsequent inventors.  The model developed here abstracts from issues
of licensing and the division of rents to focus on how the proportion of proprietary and non-
proprietary discoveries affects the economic value of patents. 
Scotchmer (96) considers the question of whether secondary inventions, made possible by
an initial "pioneering" discovery, should be patentable.  In a model where the initial inventor may
contract with possible developers of derivative products, she shows that secondary inventions should27  They also consider the incentive effects of the "first to file" and "first to invent rules," which are related to
the issue of novelty.
28  He also points out using evidence of commercial success as a test of nonobviousness may inadvertently
reward better marketing and distribution rather than better products.
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be unpatentable to ensure that the inventor of the pioneering discovery has the socially optimal
incentive to conduct research.  This result does not follow if ex-ante contracts are not feasible or
when subsequent inventions do not depend entirely on the initial one.
Scotchmer and Green (90) show how the disclosure requirements of patent law may
discourage firms from patenting intermediate discoveries, if by doing so they lose an advantage over
their competitors in ongoing research.  In a model of a two-stage patent race, they consider two
standards of novelty (strong and weak) that really have the flavor of a nonobviousness requirement.
They describe the circumstances when firms choose not to take advantage of the weaker standard.
27
In their model, a weaker nonobviousness requirement is never associated with less innovation.  The
model developed here, in which the horizon is infinite, shows that innovation may actually decrease
because the weaker standard erodes the value of patents.
Merges (88, 92) argues that one role of patents and strict nonobviousness requirements is to
encourage firms to engage in "risky" R&D projects, i.e., where there is less certainty of commercial
success.
28  If less risky projects would be undertaken absent a patent, there is little social gain to
extending protection to more obvious inventions.  There is, however, the social cost of additional
monopolies.  There are additional losses if firms redirect their research toward less risky projects.
The R&D process used in this paper follows the initial models of stochastic patent races
developed by Loury (79), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (80), and Lee and Wilde (80).  These models
consider an environment where several firms attempt to make a single discovery before their12
competitors.  Reinganum (85) extends the Lee and Wilde (80) framework to a finite sequence of
patent races.  Each invention confers to its inventor a certain exogenous flow profit that continues
until the next invention occurs.  Each new discovery destroys the rents of the prior one, giving the
model a flavor of Shumpeterian competition.
The model constructed here is similar in structure to Reinganum’s (85), but differs in several
ways.  Flow profits depend on the extent of the innovation, which is stochastic.  Not all inventions
qualify for protection.  An innovation failing to satisfy the nonobviousness requirement is
appropriated by all firms, so it does not affect existing profits.  The value of inventing, or failing to
invent, the next improvement is endogenously determined and depends on the expected date of the
next nonobvious invention.
Two recent papers report a result similar to the single peak result (Proposition 5) found here.
O'Donoghue (98)  constructs a model where firms choose their R&D intensity and the extent of their
innovations with certainty.  He shows that in the presence of transactions costs or costly monopoly
distortions, a patent regime based on strict nonobviousness requirements is superior to a regime that
requires innovators to license from prior inventors.  Cadot and Lippman (95) construct a model of
innovation  where a technological leader engages in R&D competition with an imitator.  The leader's
incentive to innovate depends on the amount of time required for the imitator to reverse engineer the
latest discovery.  They show that the leader's R&D intensity is maximized by an intermediate  delay
between its discovery and successful imitation of the discovery.
The endogenous growth models of Aghion and Howitt (92) and Grossman and Helpman (91)
describe a process of perpetual growth driven by a sequence of innovations generated by firms
engaging in research and development.  In a related paper, Lach and Rob (96) consider a single13
industry where firms purchase cost-reducing inventions and sink vintage-specific capital into
production.  We can interpret these models as an extreme case of the model constructed here, when
all innovations satisfy the nonobviousness requirement and every discovery eliminates the rents
associated with the prior one.  By allowing for heterogeneity in the magnitude of discoveries, and
conditioning patent protection on the basis of this magnitude, we can extend the analysis of these
models by considering the effect of differing intellectual property regimes.  
4.  The Model
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite.  Discoveries occur at different points in time.
It is convenient to divide time into the intervals between these discoveries.  We call each of these
intervals a patent race.  During each patent race, firms compete to be the first to discover an
invention.  The race ends when a discovery occurs.  The next race begins immediately after the
discovery.  Because there is randomness in the process that generates discoveries, the actual duration
of patent races will vary.
A.  Competition in R&D 
There are n+1 firms, indexed by the superscript i.  At the beginning of the race, firms
simultaneously choose their R&D intensity, denoted  .  Firms maintain their level of effort until h
i
k
a discovery occurs and the current race ends.  The flow cost of conducting R&D, denoted pC(h
i
k),
is a strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable function of R&D intensity.  The coefficient
p represents the relative price of R&D inputs.  All firms share the same R&D technology.
A firm’s R&D intensity affects its rate of discovery, but does not determine the exact date that
it will make a discovery.  Instead, R&D intensity determines a probability distribution over invention
dates.  On average, a firm that exerts more effort will make a discovery before a firm that exerts less29  A firm’s choice of R&D spending affects the distribution over invention dates in the sense of first order
stochastic dominance.
30  While this is an ad hoc restriction on behavior, it considerably simplifies the model and subsequent analysis.




29  A simple way to capture these properties is to assume that discoveries arrive through time
according to a Poisson process,  where the arrival rate of discoveries is determined by the R&D
intensity of the firm.  We assume that the arrival rate of ideas for firm i is   where   represents h
i
k,
an industry-specific productivity parameter.
Let   denote the time elapsed in the kth patent race before firm i makes a discovery.  If firm t
i
k









One characteristic of Poisson processes is that they are memoryless.  This means that the
hazard rate of discoveries -- the probability that a firm makes a discovery in the next instant of time,
given that it has not already made a discovery -- is constant and equal to the firm’s R&D intensity.





during the kth race.  Firm i wins the race if it invents before any other firm.  The probability that it












We make one further assumption about the nature of technological competition: Firms that
discover a patentable invention do not compete in the subsequent patent race.
30  A firm that owns
a patented invention will be called an incumbent.  The other firms will be called challengers.  31  Alternatively, we can express innovations as some percent reduction in the cost of producing some final
good. In this case   < 1. The analysis will be consistent with the quality improvement representation if we assume that ¯ u
cost reductions are perfectly compatible, so that a cost reduction applied to different vintages of technology achieves the
same percent reduction in cost.
32  More generally, we expect that firms affect the expected date and magnitude of their discoveries.  Although
we ignore the latter from the analysis, the nonobviousness requirement may indeed affect the ambitiousness of R&D
programs.  See Merges (88).
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B.  Inventions and the System of Property Rights
A discovery is an improvement in product quality.  The extent of an improvement is denoted
uk[0, ],   <  .
31  The magnitude of improvements is random, unknown until the time of invention, ¯ u ¯ u
and common knowledge thereafter.  For each invention, u is drawn from the continuous density f(u)
with corresponding cumulative density F(u).  This distribution is constant through time and
unaffected by the level of a firm’s R&D spending.
32
We assume that once a discovery has been made, it can be reverse-engineered at zero cost
by all other firms.  This means that discoveries are only proprietary if they are protected by the
system of intellectual property rights.  If a patent is granted, the inventor receives an exclusive right
to produce and sell that invention.  For simplicity, we assume that the statutory life of the patent is
infinite.  Not all inventions will be protected, however.  Let s[0, ] denote the minimum extent of ¯ u
improvement for which the patent office is willing to grant a patent.  This represents the standard
of nonobviousness.  An invention whose extent is less than s is not protected and becomes part of
the public domain of product improvements.  Let  (s) = 1- F(s) denote the ex-ante probability of
obtaining patent protection, given the standard of nonobviousness s.
Patent claims are defined as the improvement itself, so that each improvement does not
infringe the patent on another.  We must make some assumption about the right of an inventor to use33  We are not concerned here with how firms might share the rents of sequential innovations. That question
is addressed in Scotchmer (96) and Green and Scotchmer (92, 95).
34  Lach and Rob (96) use a more natural approach by combining new technology with the acquisition of
vintage-specific production equipment. In a model of Cournot competition, the introduction of new technologies leads
to a more gradual erosion of profits until the older firms exit altogether.
35  Section 2 of the paper describes this law in greater detail. 
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prior generations of improvements.  For example, firms may be required to license all prior
improvements from their inventors.  At the other extreme, we could assume that an inventor may use
all prior discoveries without obtaining a license.  We assume an intermediate case: if an invention
satisfies the standard of nonobviousness, the inventor may use all prior discoveries without licensing
them.
33  However, if the standard is not satisfied, the prior discoveries remain proprietary. 
One implication of this specification is that there is always, at most, one protected invention.
Each time another patentable discovery is made, the inventor of the last patented invention loses her
exclusive rights.  Thus while the statutory length of patent protection is infinite, the economic life
of a patent is the amount of time until the next patentable invention.
While this is an arbitrary definition of property rights, it captures in a very tractable way the
phenomenon we wish to study.  We focus on how the accumulation of proprietary inventions erodes
the profits associated with an existing patent.  The simplest way to represent this is to assume that
the first proprietary invention eliminates those rents entirely, while nonproprietary inventions have
no effect at all.
34  The definition reflects the system of property rights specified by the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA).
35  Under the SCPA, a firm that reverse engineers another firm’s36  This description is also a natural generalization of the property rights assumed in Reinganum (85), Grossman
and Helpman (91), Lach and Rob (96), and Aghion and Howitt (92).  In each of these models, every innovation receives
protection and the length of this protection is only the amount of time until the next invention.  This is equivalent to
setting the standard of nonobviousness in this model to s = 0.
37  These assumptions make the consumer’s problem stationary.  If we characterize innovations as cost
reductions, we get the same behavior by assuming a constant elasticity of demand function with an elasticity of one.
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product need not pay royalties if the design it develops is sufficiently better than the original and the
standard of sufficiently better is the standard of nonobviousness.
36
C.  The Output Market and Flow Profits
All consumers are identical and aggregate demand is normalized to one.  The reservation
value of the final product to consumers is simply the level of its quality.
37  The best available
technology during the kth patent race is a product embodying all of the improvements that have





extent of the innovation protected during the kth race.
Firms compete in prices and the cost of production is zero.  The system of property rights
described above implies that the incumbent can offer the best available technology Uk while other









The kth invention is
Patentable Unpatentable
Incumbent of the kth race 0 u
p
k
Winning challenger uk 0
Losing challenger 0 0
Table 1: Flow profits earned during the k+1st race as a function of the kth discovery
Firm i’s flow profits during the k+1st race depend on two outcomes that occur in the kth race.
The first is the determination of which firm invents first.  The second is the determination of the
invention’s magnitude.  If firm i discovers an improvement and it satisfies the nonobviousness
standard, its flow profits during the k+1st race are uk.  If the improvement satisfies the
nonobviousness standard, but is discovered by another firm, i’s flow profits will be zero.  If the
improvement is found to be obvious, the flow profits of each firm in the next race will be the same
as those earned in the current race.
5.  Equilibrium
This section establishes the existence and properties of a stationary, symmetric equilibrium
of the game described in the previous section.  During each patent race, challengers choose a level
of R&D activity that balances spending in the current period against the expected gains earned in
future races.  The expected gains are a weighted average of the values of winning and losing the
current race, discounted to reflect the expected length of the current race.  The choice of R&D
intensity affects the probabilities of winning and losing the current race, as well as the expected
length of the current race.19
A.  Constructing the Firm’s Problem
During each race, firms choose the R&D intensity that maximizes the expected present value
of current cash flow plus the expected present value of competing optimally in future races.  For
challengers, current cash flows are R&D expenditures, -pC( ).  The value of competing in the next h
i
k
race is a weighted average of the discounted values of the position conferred by winning or losing
the current race. 
We use  to denote the expected value of playing optimally in the next race when the firm V w
wins the current race.  We use  to denote the expected value of playing optimally in the next race V l
when the firm loses the current race.  We will refer to these as continuation values.  These values
could vary across races, but not in the stationary equilibrium we study, so we suppress the time
subscripts on these values.  In the stationary equilibrium we examine, the behavior of firms in the
current race does not affect the continuation values.  For the moment, we will treat  and  as V w V l
parameters.  Later, we will compute their values in equilibrium.
To compute the weighted averages of the possible outcomes of the current race, we introduce
the following probabilities:



















v) The probability that firm i makes a discovery at date t, given that it hasn’t yet made a






Firms incur R&D expenses until the first discovery occurs.  The present value of R&D

























expected present value of R&D expenditures over the current race.  It is a measure of the expected
length of the current race.  If the industry’s R&D intensity is low, the expected date of the next
discovery is far off.  The discount factor is relatively large, reflecting the fact that R&D spending
will probably go on for some time.  If the industry’s R&D intensity is high, the discount factor is
smaller, because the next discovery is likely to occur very soon.
When the race ends, each firm is either a winner or a loser.  The expected present value of



















which depends on the expected date of the first discovery and the probability of being the inventor
of that discovery.  Similarly, the expected present value of losing the current race is38  This assumption guarantees that firms’ current returns are bounded. 
39  A quadratic cost function, for example, satisfies this condition.
40  Assumptions (vi) and (vii) are stability conditions that determine a number of properties of the equilibrium.












































We make the following assumptions about the R&D technology:
(i) h[0, ] s.t.  , C( ) < 	; (v) C’(h)h - C(h) 
 0;  ¯ h ¯ h ¯ h
(ii) C’(h) > 0, C"(h) > 0,  h > 0; (vi) C"(h)h - C’(h) 
 0;
(iii) limh60 C(h)/h = limh60 C’(h) = 0;  (vii) (n+1)
 1.
(iv) lim¯ h64C(¯ h)	;
The first assumption states that R&D programs are subject to saturation.
38  The second states
that R&D effort is costly at the margin and the marginal cost of additional effort is increasing.  The
third and fourth assumptions ensure that the firm’s objective function is maximized by some
intermediate level of R&D effort.  The fifth assumption implies that production of R&D intensity
is subject to diminishing returns.  The sixth assumption states that the R&D cost function is
sufficiently convex.
39  The seventh assumption requires that the R&D productivity coefficient not
be too small.
4023
The first order condition of the firms’ problem identifies the level of R&D intensity where



































Equation [3] relates the marginal cost of additional R&D to the sum of two present values.
The first term is called the replacement effect because it measures the value of replacing ongoing
R&D expenditures with the continuation value of being the winner.  The second term is called the
rivalry effect because it measures the difference between the values of starting the next race as the
winner or loser of the current one.  Firms will spend more on R&D when either of these two values
increases.  The replacement effect is more important when there is little effective rivalry (  is a
i
k
small).  Then the firm worries less about losing the race and more about how soon it can replace its
current expenditures with flow profits.  When the firm encounters more effective rivalry  (  is a
i
k
large), the rivalry effect is more important than the replacement effect.  In this case, the firm worries
more about losing the current race than about how soon it can replace its current R&D spending.
B.  The Stationary Symmetric Equilibrium 
A strategy of a firm in the game is a specification of a feasible R&D intensity to be played
in each race, for each possible history of the game preceding that race.  When the firm is the
incumbent, its only feasible R&D intensity is zero.  Whenever the firm is a challenger, the set of24
feasible R&D intensities is always the same subset of .  Payoffs are the discounted sum of the
present values of any flow profits or R&D expenditures that occur in the patent races.  At the
beginning of each race, each firm knows the play of all firms in the prior races and the outcomes of
those races.  There are likely to be many equilibria of the game, but we choose to focus on stationary
equilibria where firms choose identical strategies.  We can show the following:
Proposition 1: If the R&D cost function satisfies the assumptions (i)-(vii) above, there exists
a unique stationary symmetric equilibrium of the game.
In the appendix, we show that assumptions (ii) - (v) establish the existence and uniqueness




stage games.  This best response is described by the first order condition to the firm’s problem, i.e.,
[3].  We then compute the equation that describes the best response of firms when they all choose
the same R&D intensity and provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the symmetric best
response in the stage games. 
The structure of the game is stationary in the sense that the R&D production technology, the
distribution over invention magnitudes, and the relationship between patented technology and
resulting profits do not vary across races.  The expected outcome of the races, then, varies only if
firms choose different R&D intensities over time.  We will examine an equilibrium where firms
respond to the same conditions in the same way through time. 
The exact magnitude of flow profits associated with a patentable discovery is not known until
the discovery has actually occurred.  Firms use the expected value of flow profits, denoted u
e, when





where  is the conditional probability distribution over patentable discoveries. f(u)/[1F(s)]f(u)/
The incumbent of the next race earns flow profits for the duration of that race.  When that
race ends, one of two things will happen.  If the next race results in a patentable discovery, the
incumbent’s flow profits are eliminated and it will begin the subsequent race as a challenger.  But
if the next race is ended by an unpatentable discovery, the incumbent continues to earn its flow profit
during the subsequent race.  As long as the firm is the incumbent, it faces the same set of possible
outcomes in the next race. 
A firm that begins the next race as a challenger spends a constant flow cost for the duration
of the race.  If it loses that race, it begins the subsequent race as a challenger.  If it wins the next race,
and its discovery is patentable, it begins the subsequent race as an incumbent.  However, if its
discovery is not patentable, it continues as a challenger in the subsequent race.  As long as the firm
is a challenger, it faces the same set of possible outcomes in the next race. 
Suppose that all firms choose the same R&D intensity, h, in all future races.  The
probabilities of winning and losing, together with the expected  length of races, will be the same in
each race.  Ex ante, each race looks like any other.  The values of being an incumbent or a
challenger, denoted V
I(h) and V
C(h), respectively, also do not change.  The only question is whether
a firm begins the race as the incumbent or as a challenger.  The expected value of losing is the
expected value of being a challenger in the subsequent race, i.e.,   The expected value of V lV C(h).
winning is not, however, the value of being the incumbent in the next race.  If the resulting discovery
is patentable, the firm indeed enjoys the expected value of starting the next race as the incumbent.26
But if the discovery is unpatentable, the firm begins the next race as a challenger.  The expected
value of winning the current race is then a weighted average of the values of being an incumbent or
a challenger in the next race, i.e., The difference in the values of winning V w V I(h)(1 )V C(h).
and losing a race is then   the difference between the values of being the [V wV l] [V I(h)V C(h)],
incumbent and a challenger times the probability that a firm’s discovery is patentable.
This structure implies that the expected value of being an incumbent in the next race is 

















 u e nhV C(h)
nhr
.
Similarly the expected value of starting the next race as a challenger is











Because firms switch between being incumbents and challengers, the continuation values
V
I(h) and V
C(h) are functions of each other.  Using the preceding equations, we find that
V I(h) r h u e nhpC(h)
r[r (n1)h]
,      [4a] V C(h) hu er nh pC(h)
r[r (n1)h]
.      [4b]
The stationary behavior of firms implies continuation values that are a weighted average of
the expected flow profit enjoyed by incumbents and the R&D expenditures of challengers.  On
average, firms spend  h/[r+ (n+1)h] of time as incumbents.  On average, firms spend
nh/[r+ (n+1)h] of  time as challengers.  These are the stationary (transition) probabilities of
moving from one state (incumbent or challenger) to the other.  The remaining fraction of time,27
r/[r+ (n+1)h], accounts for the proportion of time that firms remain in their initial state.
Multiplying the associated flow profit and costs by these probabilities generates weighted averages
of the expected cash flow a firm will earn over all future patent races.  Dividing by r converts the
average flows into present values. 
But  h is also the probability that a given firm will make a patentable discovery in the next
instant of time.  The average amount of time between discoveries is 1/ (n+1)h.  Incorporating the
discount rate r, we can convert the cash flow earned over the next race into present values by using
the coefficient 1/[r+ (n+1)h], the discount factor associated with the average length of patent races.
Thus when we consider the difference in the values of being an incumbent or a challenger in the next
race, we find that
[V I(h)V C(h)] u epC(h)
r (n1)h
,
which is the present value of earning the incumbent’s expected flow profit and avoiding a
challenger’s R&D expenditures over the expected length of a race.  The denominator is also a
measure of the economic life of patents.  As (n+1)h becomes larger, patentable discoveries occur
more frequently.  The incumbent enjoys its gain for less time, on average, so the present value of the
gain is smaller. 
Because   and  we can define the symmetric best V lV C(h) V w V I(h)(1 )V C(h),
response of firms as a function of V
I and V
C.  A symmetric stationary equilibrium of the game is an
R&D intensity, denoted , that is a best response to the continuation values V
I() and V
C().  In the
appendix, we show that equations [3], [4a], and [4b] imply that  is the solution to the following
equation:28
pC(h) [V I(h)V C(h)](1 )0. [5]
The left hand side of [5] is the cost of additional R&D effort.  At the margin, this is the cost  of
moving the firm’s expected invention date just ahead of any of its competitors.  The right hand side
is the expected gain associated with becoming the first inventor, taking into account the probability
that the invention is patentable.  The gain is measured relative to the expected value of being a
challenger in the next race.  Thus, if the invention is obvious, a challenger remains a challenger and
gains nothing.  The larger the expected gain associated with inventing first, the more firms are
willing to spend to invent faster. 
C.  Properties of the Equilibrium
The model allows us to differentiate industries by the number of firms, R&D productivity,
discount rates, and R&D input prices.  Each of these parameters affects the equilibrium R&D
intensity of firms.  We can show the following: 
Proposition 2 - If the R&D technology satisfies (vi) and (vii), the industry rate of innovation
is increasing in the number of firms and the productivity of R&D, but
decreasing in the discount rate and the price of R&D inputs.
Increasing the number of firms or the productivity of R&D activity causes per firm R&D
activity to decline.  But Proposition 2 states that such changes increase the industrywide rate of
innovation when the cost function for R&D is sufficiently convex (assumption vi) and the
productivity parameter is not too small (assumption vii).  These  assumptions can be thought of as
stability conditions because they imply that firms’ responses to changes in the parameters are not41  Other racing models, including Loury [79], Lee and Wilde [80], and Reinganum [85,] assume that similar
stability conditions are satisfied.
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too great.
41  In the appendix, we show that firms’ R&D activity is inelastic with respect to changes
in the number of firms or the productivity of R&D.  Thus while firms decrease their activity, the
decline is not sufficient to offset the activity of the additional firm or the additional productivity of
R&D.
As the discount rate increases, firms discount future gains more heavily, reducing their value.
The equilibrium condition states that the marginal cost of current R&D equals the expected gain.
Because the expected gain declines in value, firms reduce their R&D activity.  Similarly, increasing
the R&D input price causes the marginal cost of current R&D efforts to rise.  Firms compensate by
reducing their R&D activity until the marginal cost and the expected gain are again equal.  In the
appendix, we show that, under assumptions vi and vii, firms’ R&D activity is inelastic with respect
to changes in input prices.  Thus while activity declines, R&D expenditures will increase.
The model suggests that industries with more firms, more productive R&D, lower discount
rates, and lower input prices will innovate more rapidly.  A less obvious implication of the preceding
analysis is that the opportunity cost of increasing R&D at the firm level is lower  for firms in rapidly
innovating industries.  For example, in industries with more firms, lower input prices, or higher
productivity, the marginal cost of R&D is lower.  And while the marginal cost of R&D in industries
with lower discount rates is higher, each dollar of R&D  is associated with a larger expected gain
associated with inventing first.  This intuition will be important when we analyze the effects of
changes in the nonobviousness requirement on different industries. 42  To avoid confusion over signs, the following calculations assume an increase in the nonobviousness
requirement.
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6.  Changing the Nonobviousness Requirement
A.  The General Problem
Suppose we make the nonobviousness requirement more strict (increase s).
42  How will firms
respond? We know that in equilibrium firms equate the marginal cost of additional R&D effort to
the expected gain associated with inventing first.  If stricter nonobviousness requirements cause the
expected gain to rise, firms will increase their R&D activity.  If the expected gain declines, firms will
reduce their R&D activity. 
Increasing the standard of nonobviousness causes the expected gain to inventing first to

















The static effect of an increase in the nonobviousness requirement is the change in the
probability that a firm’s next discovery will be patentable.  This is the first term on the right hand
side of equation [6].  The dynamic effect of stricter nonobviousness requirements is the change in
the values of being the incumbent and a challenger in the subsequent patent races.  This is captured
in the second term of [6].
Stricter nonobviousness requirements reduce the likelihood that inventions qualify for patent
protection   so the static effect is always negative.  Conversely, relaxing the (
 /
s<0),
nonobviousness requirement increases the probability that a firm’s next discovery will be patentable43  Note that the derivatives taken in equations [7] and [8] are done holding constant the level of future R&D.
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and thus increases the expected gain to inventing first.  This should encourage firms to conduct more
R&D.  This is precisely the intuition behind many of the proposals to relax patentability standards
in the 1980s.  
But the analysis is not complete until we consider the direction and magnitude of the
dynamic effect.  It is the difference in the effects on the continuation values for the incumbent and





















[V I( )V C( )] . [8]
For the incumbent, there are two benefits of stricter nonobviousness requirements.  First, the
average flow profit of patentable discoveries increases.
43  The present value of this increase is [u
e(s)-
s]/r.  The incumbent enjoys this improvement [r+]/[r+(n+1)] percent of the time.  This is
the first term in brackets in [7].  Second, because fewer discoveries qualify for protection, a smaller
proportion of future discoveries will eliminate the incumbent’s patent.  This increases the average
amount of time between patentable discoveries and thus the average length of patent races.  In other
words, the economic life of  patents has increased.  The gain associated with longer patent life is the
difference in the values of being an incumbent and a challenger, multiplied by the initial proportion
of time the incumbent would have spent as a challenger, n/[r+(n+1)].  This is the second32
term in [7].  The second term can also be interpreted as the present value of remaining the
incumbent, discounted to reflect the expected date on which the incumbent’s patent would have been
eliminated by a marginal discovery.  This is more important when the economic life of patents is
short, because the benefit is discounted less heavily than when patents are expected to last a long
time.
Equation [8] shows that there is a benefit and a cost of stricter nonobviousness requirements
for challengers.  The benefit is again the increase in the average flow profit of patentable discoveries,
which a challenger enjoys /[r+(n+1)] percent of the time.  The cost is the fact that a
challenger’s next discovery is less likely to be patentable.  After the change in standards, when a
challenger makes a marginal discovery (u = s), it remains a challenger.  The loss is the difference
in the values of being an incumbent and a challenger, multiplied by the initial proportion of the time
it could expect to be an incumbent, /[r+(n+1)].  The cost can also be interpreted as the
present value of the loss associated with the increase in the average length of patent races.  The loss
is discounted to reflect the expected date on which the challenger would have made a patentable
discovery under the old standard. 
Equations [7] and [8] show that stricter nonobviousness requirements raise the value of being
an incumbent and may increase or decrease the value of being a challenger.  But the net effect of















[V I( )V C( )] >0. [9]
The dynamic effect is a weighted average of the benefits associated with the higher average
flow profit of patentable discoveries and the longer economic life of patents.  The weights depend33
on (n+1), the industrywide arrival rate of patentable discoveries.  The average length of time
between patentable discoveries, and thus the economic life of patents, is inversely related to this
arrival rate.  When patentable discoveries are infrequent, that is, when (n+1) is small, the
increase in their average profitability is relatively more important than the  increase in the economic
life of patents.  When patentable discoveries occur frequently, the increase in the economic life of
patents is relatively more important than the increase in their average profitability.
It is now clear that the static and dynamic effects of stricter nonobviousness requirements
work in opposite directions.  Tighter patentability standards decrease the likelihood that a firm’s next
discovery will be patentable, which reduces the expected gain associated with R&D.  On the other
hand, tighter standards increase the expected value of being an incumbent relative to the expected
value of being a challenger.  This raises the expected gain associated with R&D.  This ambiguity
raises two questions.  First, does one of these effects always dominate? If the static effect is always
stronger, the conventional wisdom motivating many recent changes in intellectual property law is
essentially sound.  But if the static effect doesn’t always dominate the dynamic effect, can we say
anything about when one effect is more important than the other? These questions are addressed in
the following sections.
B.  The Relative Strength of the Static and Dynamic Effects
The response of firms to a change in the nonobviousness requirement depends on its effect
on the expected gain to inventing first.  Suppose the standard of nonobviousness is increased.  The
expected gain to inventing first is increased by a rise in the average profitability of patented
inventions but is also reduced by the lost cash flow of marginal discoveries that are no longer
patentable.  Combining equations [6] and [9], we find 34







The dynamic effect dominates the static effect when (s) > 0.
Corollary 4: Relaxing the nonobviousness requirement will increase R&D activity when the static
effect dominates the dynamic effect, i.e., when (s) < 0.  It will decrease R&D
activity when (s) > 0.
As the nonobviousness requirement is made more strict, firms encounter the following
tradeoff.  On the one hand, a firm that makes a marginal discovery fails to obtain a patent and
continues as a challenger in the next race.  It loses the associated profit and the cost of R&D
spending it would have avoided for the length of the next race.  The present value of the lost cash
flow is increasing in the expected length of the next race.  When patentable discoveries are
infrequent, these losses are relatively large.  But when patentable discoveries occur frequently, the
value of these losses is smaller.  On the other hand, a stricter nonobviousness requirement raises the
average flow profit of patentable discoveries.  The associated gain is increasing in the frequency of
patentable discoveries.  The net effect is a weighted average of these cash flow gains and losses,
where the weights are determined by the industrywide arrival rate of patentable discoveries.  This
is the intuition of Proposition 3.
Corollary 4 uses Proposition 3 to address the policy question raised in this paper.  If the
weighted average computed above is negative, reductions in the standard of nonobviousness will44  Throughout this paper, we implicitly assume that increasing R&D activity is socially beneficial.  This
corresponds with the sentiments of the proponents for intellectual property reform in the 1980s.  It is possible, however,
that firms will overinvest in R&D  relative to the socially optimal level  because the patent system rewards only firms
that invent first.  This is often referred to as the racing effect and is discussed extensively in the industrial organization
literature. 
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indeed increase firms’ R&D activity and consequently the rate of innovation.  When this weighted
average is positive, R&D activity and the rate of innovation will decline. 
We have not yet established whether the dynamic effect is ever more important than the static
effect.  We do this in the following proposition:  
Proposition 5: There is a unique standard of nonobviousness, denoted s*, such that in the
interval [0, s*), R&D activity is strictly increasing in the standard of
nonobviousness. 
In the appendix, we show that when the standard of nonobviousness is very weak, the
dynamic effect is stronger than the static effect.  Consequently, increases in the standard raise R&D
activity.  As we make the requirement more strict, the dynamic effect becomes smaller while the
static effect becomes larger.  When the nonobviousness requirement is very strict, the static effect
dominates.  There is only one standard of nonobviousness, where the two effects are exactly equal.
We can use the critical nonobviousness standard, s*, to divide the interval of possible
nonobviousness requirements [0, ] into two regions.  In the interval [0, s*), an increase in the ¯ u
standard raises R&D activity.  We call this the dynamic region.  In the interval (s*,  ], an increase ¯ u
in the standard causes R&D activity to fall.  We call this the static region.  R&D activity and the rate
of innovation is maximized by setting the nonobviousness requirement at s* and protecting [1-F(s*)]
percent of all discoveries.
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C.  Implications for Rapidly Innovating Industries
In this section, we investigate the factors that determine the relative size of the dynamic and
static regions identified in the preceding section.  The size of these regions varies with the factors
that affect the equilibrium rate of innovation in an industry.  We can use these relationships to
tentatively evaluate some of the changes in intellectual property law introduced during the 1980s.
Recall that the dynamic effect is stronger than the static effect when (s) > 0.  Greater weight
is placed on the increase in average profitability of patentable discoveries when the industrywide
arrival rate of patentable discoveries is high.  This suggests, but does not prove, that the dynamic
effect is more important in industries that innovate rapidly.  There is potential for ambiguity if the
flow R&D expenditures of firms in such industries are higher.  Higher R&D spending makes the
second term more negative, causing (s) to fall.  In the appendix, we prove the following:
Proposition 6: The critical standard of nonobviousness, s*, is increasing in the equilibrium
rate of innovation.
Corollary 7: In rapidly innovating industries, a smaller proportion of inventions can be protected
by patents without causing the rate of innovation to decline.
In section 5C, we showed that lower input prices, higher R&D productivity, more firms, or
lower discount rates were associated with higher rates of innovation, but not necessarily higher levels
of per firm R&D spending.  Increases in R&D productivity or the number of firms actually reduce
per firm R&D activity and expenditures.  Decreases in the discount rate  increase per firm R&D
spending but also shift the probability weight away from the cash flow losses.  Lower input prices
induce higher R&D activity, but not so much that actual expenditures rise.  For each of the
parameters studied, firms in rapidly innovating industries face a lower opportunity cost to raising37
their R&D activity than do firms in industries that innovate more slowly.  Consequently, the
dynamic effect dominates over a larger range of nonobviousness requirements in industries that
innovate more rapidly.  This corresponds to a smaller region of nonobviousness requirements where
reductions in the standard encourages additional R&D.
Consider the following example.  There are two industries that are identical in every respect
except their R&D input prices, where p1 < p2.  The analysis in section 5 shows that firms in the first
industry conduct more R&D than firms in the second.  Consequently, the first industry innovates
more rapidly than the second.  The arrival rate of patentable discoveries will also be higher.  From
Proposition 6, we know the R&D maximizing standard of nonobviousness is not the same for both
industries.  In fact, s1* > s2*, implying that the static region of the first industry is smaller than the
static region of the second.  Depending on the initial nonobviousness requirement, reductions in this
requirement are more likely to reduce R&D activity in the first industry than in the second.  In
addition, the R&D maximizing standard of nonobviousness protects a smaller proportion of
discoveries in the first industry than in the second.  Consequently, the objectives of maximizing
R&D activity and extending patent protection to a larger share of all discoveries are least compatible
in rapidly innovating industries.
7.  Conclusions
This paper describes an environment where the profitability of inventions is eroded  by the
introduction of new, competing technologies through time.  When firms can readily duplicate each
other’s discoveries, the nonobviousness requirement plays an important role in determining the
proportion of discoveries that do not affect the profits earned by proprietary discoveries.  The38
nonobviousness requirement  affects the value of patents by determining the average profitability of
patentable discoveries and the expected duration of these profits.  
We show that in such an environment, there exists a unique standard of nonobviousness that
maximizes the rate of innovation in an industry.  This critical standard also tells us the share of all
possible values of the standard where relaxing the nonobviousness requirement will raise R&D
activity.  Finally, we show that a reduction in the nonobviousness requirement is less likely to raise
R&D activity in industries that already innovate rapidly. 
The actual change in R&D activity caused by a reduction in the nonobviousness requirement
depends on industry characteristics and the initial stringency of the standard.  This model cannot
show that the actions taken in the 1980s will lead to less R&D activity.  But it does show that such
an outcome is possible and that the likelihood of such an outcome is higher for rapidly innovating
industries.  It also predicts that R&D activity may increase in certain industries and decline in others.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, reductions in the nonobviousness requirement are more likely
to encourage innovation in industries that innovate slowly than in industries that innovate rapidly.
Consequently, these changes could favor traditional industries over the high technology industries
these proposals were designed to encourage.  Given that policymakers were particularly concerned
about high technology industries, there should be some concern about whether the new intellectual
property regime has helped or, in fact, has made the problem worse.
There is ample room for development of the theoretical model.  Perhaps the most fruitful
extension is to reintroduce patent breadth, which allows us to incorporate the issues of patent45  O’Donoghue (98) does this in an environment where invention magnitudes are chosen with certainty.  It
would be interesting to incorporate his definition of leading and lagging breadth in the context of stochastic invention
magnitudes and examine how the welfare results change.
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infringement and of cross licensing.
45  By introducing a fixed cost to R&D programs, we can allow
for entry and evaluate how nonobviousness requirements affect the equilibrium number of firms in
an industry.  By allowing for heterogeneity in the distribution over invention magnitudes, we can
evaluate how nonobviousness requirements affect otherwise identical industries.  Then we can
analyze how a uniform patent law "favors" certain types of industries over others.  The property
rights constructed here can easily be introduced into models of endogenous growth.  Finally, we can
examine how the standard of nonobviousness affects collusive equilibria, where firms control the
level of R&D competition to maximize the value of their patents. 
The final assessment of the intellectual property reforms of the 1980s is an empirical
question.  Given that a decade has passed since most of the changes were introduced, there should
now be adequate data to test whether a structural change in R&D activity has occurred.  The model
suggests a strong testable implication: R&D activity in industries that traditionally innovate slowly
should rise by more than any increase in R&D for rapidly innovating industries.
Empirical analysis is complicated by the fact that there were so many changes, including tax
changes, attributing any structural change to particular reforms may prove difficult.  Another
complication is ambiguity in the measurement of R&D intensity.  Any attempt to distinguish
between industries on the basis of R&D intensity must take into account input prices and
productivity.  Innovation can be measured by outputs, such as patents.  But this is also problematic,
as the definition of patents has changed and certain industries can obtain patents more easily than
others.40
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APPENDIX
Proposition 1 - Suppose the R&D technology satisfies the following assumptions: 
(i) h[0, ] s.t.  , C( ) < ;  ¯ h ¯ h ¯ h
(ii) C’(h) > 0, C"(h) > 0,  h > 0;
(iii) limh60 C(h)/h = limh60 C’(h) = 0; 
(iv) lim¯ h64C(¯ h);
(v) C’(h)h - C(h)  0;
(vi) C"(h)h - C’(h)  0; and
(vii)     (n+1) 1.
Then there exists a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium of the game.
Proof: The proof is constructed through the lemmas that follow. 








Proof: We need to show that for each level of rivalry  there is at least one level of effort h a
i
k[0,]
























i.e., the minimum average cost of R&D is not too high.  The third assumption assures us that the
condition is satisfied for at least one strictly positive level of effort.







Proof: The structure of the stage games is similar to the model found in Reinganum (85).  The proof
of existence is a modification of the proof for her model.  We assume that a firm’s choice of R&D
effort affects the likelihood of winning and the expected length of the patent race, but does not affect
the expected values of playing optimally in future races.  The derivative of the firm’s objective































































If the saturation point of R&D ( ) is sufficiently large, there will be a finite level of R&D effort, ¯ h
denoted  <  , where   For any level of effort  , the firm’s objective function is ˆ h
i







k > ˆ h
i
k
























best response is unique.
Firms never choose R&D intensities greater than  , so we can restrict the strategy space to  a ˆ h
i
k
convex, compact, nonempty subset of 

















maps X into itself continuously.  Existence of an equilibrium then follows from Brouwer's fixed
point theorem.





equilibrium of the stage game.
Proof: Existence of a symmetric equilibrium follows from the objective functions and first order
condition of firms, which varies only by the level of rivalry encountered.  In the symmetric











k+1]pC(hk)  pC(hk)C(hk)hk 0.
The first and third terms are strictly decreasing in R&D effort.  If the second term is also strictly





k%1 p C(hk)hkC	(hk)< 0 .










Lemma 4 - The game is continuous at infinity.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that total firm payoffs are a discounted sum of per period payoffs and
that these per period payoffs are uniformly bounded [see Fudenberg and Tirole (91), p. 110].  The
per period payoff to firms is the present value of flow profits for the incumbent and the present value
of R&D expenditures for challengers.  The maximum per period return for an incumbent is   Per ¯ u/r.
period returns for challengers are contained in the interval [-C() / ( r + ),  0]. ¯ h ¯ h
Lemma 5 - Lemmas 1 - 4 imply the existence of a stationary symmetric equilibrium of the game.
Proof: We return to the first order condition of the stage game, but assume that the continuation
values associated with winning and losing the current race do not vary across races.  Rearranging
terms, we have:
pC(hk)r nhk  rV wpC(hk) (n1)hk[V wV l]. [A3]
If firms take the continuation values as given, and these values are constant across races, it is a best
response for each firm to choose the same R&D intensity  in each race.  Lemma 3 hkh(V w,V l)
establishes the existence of such a best response for a given specification of the continuation values.
We continue to assume that the best response is unique and will later verify that the necessary
condition is satisfied.  In section 5b of the paper, we computed the corresponding continuation
values:
V I(h) r h u e nhpC(h)
r[r (n1)h]
,    [A4] V C(h) hu er nh pC(h)
r[r (n1)h]
.    [A5]
An equilibrium of the game is described by the best response  where   and h(V w,V l) V lV C(h)
Substituting [A4] and [A5] into [A3] yields the equilibrium condition V w V I(h)(1 )V C(h).
pC(h) [V IV C]  u epC(h)
r (n1)h
. [A6]
We use   to denote the equilibrium R&D intensity that satisfies [A6].  Note that [A6] is consistent
with the condition required in lemma 3 for the uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium strategies of the
stage games. 
During each race, for every firm the R&D intensity   is the unique best response to the continuation
values   and  Then the strategy of playing   in every race cannot be improved upon by V I( ) V C( ).47
choosing a different R&D intensity in one race and playing   in all the others.  Finally, if playing 
in every race cannot be improved upon by a deviation in one stage, and the game is continuous at
infinity, choosing the R&D intensity   in each race is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game [see
Fudenberg and Tirole (91), p. 110].
Lemma 6 - The symmetric stationary equilibrium is unique.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that there is only one possible intersection of the curves described by
pC(h) and  The difference in the slopes of the two sides is [V I(h)V C(h)].





where    At h = 0, pC(h) is zero while   is u
e/r.  The (h)pC(h) [V I(h)V C(h)]. [V I(h)V C(h)]
existence of an equilibrium implies that [A7] is nonnegative at the first intersection of the curves.
If there are multiple intersections, for at least one intersection   must be increasing [V I(h)V C(h)]
faster than marginal cost.  In that equilibrium, the numerator of [A7] is negative.  A necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for such a possibility is that the R&D productivity coefficient is very small
[  < 1/(n+1)].  But this contradicts assumption (vii).
Proposition 2 - The rate of innovation in an industry is increasing in the number of firms and
the productivity of R&D, but decreasing in the discount rate and the price of
R&D inputs.
Proof: These results depend on the comparative static properties of the equilibrium: 




C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
<0;
which implies that per firm R&D effort declines.  However, the industrywide arrival
rate of discoveries depends on n .  Increasing the number of firms changes the rate
of innovation in an industry by  which is n /n,
n
n
  C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) ( 1)
C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
.
This derivative is nonnegative if C	( )  - C( )0 and  1/(n+1). 48
ii. Increasing the productivity of R&D:


 C( ) (n1)
C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
<0;
which implies that per firm R&D effort declines.  But the industrywide rate of
discovery depends on  .  Raising the productivity parameter causes the rate of
discovery to change by  which is   / ,


 rC	( ) [C	( ) (n1) C( )]
C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
.
This derivative is non-negative if C	( )  - C( )0 and  1/(n+1).




C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
<0.





 rC( ) [C( ) (n1) C( )]
C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
.
Higher input prices cause R&D activity to decline if C( )  - C( )0 and  1/(n+1).
To see if actual expenditures rise or decline, we examine the derivative p /p:
p
p
 [C	( ) C( )][r (n1) ] C( ) [ (n1)1] C( )
C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
.
This derivative is nonnegative if C	( )  - C( )0 and  1/(n+1).
Proposition 3 - The derivation of (s).
Proof: We must check the following derivative:
 ( )
s
[V I( )V C( )]
s






















[V I( )V C( )] .







[V I( )V C( )] . [A9]












Proposition 5 - There is a unique standard of nonobviousness, denoted s*, such that in the
interval [0, s*), R&D activity is strictly increasing in the standard of
nonobviousness. 








Substituting the expression for  /s, [A11] becomes 50
 (s)
s
 (s)f(s) C	( ) (n1) C( ) [ (n1)1]
C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
1.
If there exists an extremum of  (s) for some  then  (s*) = 0 and    Then, s[0, ¯ u],  (s)/s
s*1.
for all values s  > s*,  (s) < 0, implying that  /s < 0.   Thus there can be at most one extremum
of  (s).  Next, we check the values of  (s) as s  0 and s     Then we see that  ¯ u. lims6¯ u (s)
¯ u.
The other limit is 
lims60 (s) (n1) (0)u e(0)rpC( (0))
r (n1) (0)
. [A12]
To verify the sign of this expression, we evaluate the condition that ensures firms actively compete
in the patent races when s = 0. 
Lemma 7 - Lemma 1 implies that pC( (0)) 
 u e(0) (0)/[r n (0)].
Proof: When s = 0, so   = 1, the constraint derived in lemma 1 is
pC(hk)r nhk  rV wpC(hk) (n1)hk[V wV l].
Because all innovations are patentable, V
w = V
I( (0)) and V
l = V
C( (0)).  Substituting these
continuation values into the constraint yields
[r n (0)]u e(0) (0)pC( (0))
r (n1) (0)
 pC( (0))[r (n1) (0)]
(0)
.




By substituting   for pC( (0)) in [A12], we can show that u e(0) (0)/[r n (0)]
lims60 (s) n (0)
r n (0)
u e(0)>0. [A13]
The continuity of  (s) and the signs of  (0) and  ( ) imply the existence of at least one standard ¯ u
 where  (s*) = 0.  s[0, ¯ u],51
Proposition 6 - The critical standard of nonobviousness, s*, is increasing in the equilibrium
rate of innovation.
Proof: The critical standard of nonobviousness is defined by the equation  (s) = 0.  To examine how
s* varies with the rate of innovation, we compute comparative static derivatives with respect to the


















The sign is not immediately obvious, because per firm R&D intensity decreases as
the number of firms rises.  Substituting for  /n implies that
 (s)
n
 C	( )rpC( )









 (n1) [ (n1)1]

.
Recall that equilibrium R&D intensity is decreasing in its productivity, but the rate
of innovation is increasing in R&D productivity (because   falls less than   rises).
Substituting  /  into the preceding expression yields
 (s)

 (n1) C	( )rpC( )












Higher discount rates are associated with lower equilibrium R&D intensity.
Substituting  /r, we find that52
 (s)
r
pC( ) C	( ) (n1) C( )[ (n1)1]









C( )pC( )[ (n1)1]
p
.
  But higher input prices reduce equilibrium R&D intensity.  Substituting  /p, we find that
  (s)
p
r C	( )C( )C( )2[ (n1)1]
C	( )[r (n1) ]C( ) [ (n1)1]
<0 s
p
<0.